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Abstract
A puzzle only solvable by humans, or POSH, is a prompt or question with
three important properties: it can be generated by a computer, it can be answered
consistently by a human, and a human answer cannot be eﬃciently predicted by a
computer. In fact, a POSH does not necessarily have to be veriﬁable by a computer
at all. One application of POSHes is a scheme proposed by Canetti et al. that limits
oﬀ-line dictionary attacks against password-protected local storage, without the use
of any secure hardware or secret storage.
We explore the area of POSHes, implement several candidate POSHes and have
users solve them, to evaluate their eﬀectiveness. Given these data, we then implement
the above scheme as an extension to the Mozilla Firefox web browser, where it is used
to protect user certiﬁcates and saved passwords. In the course of doing so, we also
deﬁne certain aspects of the threat model for our implementation (and the scheme)
more precisely.
Thesis Supervisor: Ran Canetti
Title: Visiting Scientist
Thesis Supervisor: Ronald L. Rivest
Title: Viterbi Professor of Computer Science
3
4
Acknowledgments
This work would not have been possible without Ran Canetti, who provided guidance,
constructive feedback, and all-around enthusiasm, literally every step of the way. For
that, I owe him a great deal. Additionally, without Ron Rivest's involvement, this
project would never have gotten oﬀ the ground. For many students, Canetti and
Rivest are names one only sees on conference papers, in RFCs, or in books  I
consider myself lucky to have had the opportunity to work with them.
I would also like to thank the members of the M.I.T. Student Information Process-
ing Board for providing support, entertainment, and occasionally even good advice.
In particular, I would like to thank Jessica McKellar for drawing a large number of the
faces used in the Face Recognition puzzle, and Jeﬀ Arnold for constantly reminding
me exactly how much (or how little) time I had before each of the thesis deadlines.
I would be remiss if I did not thank all of the volunteers who contributed data to
this project by solving puzzles. Hopefully some of them found it fun, though I expect
a larger number did it solely as a favor to me.
Listing everyone who has helped me over the course of my academic career would
be impossible. I am indebted to many people for their encouragement and support,
and this is especially the case for my family. Perhaps someday we'll all sit down
together with this document, and I'll ﬁnally explain exactly what I've been up to for
this past year.
5
6
Contents
1 Introduction 11
2 Techniques in Password Security 15
2.1 Early work and current practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 A Web-based solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Password-based key exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Inkblots for stronger passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5 Other graphical password schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3 CAPTCHA Overview 25
3.1 Fuzzy Text Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Other Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Corpus-based CAPTCHAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4 Evaluating POSHes 29
4.1 Word Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2 Word Grouping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3 Draw-a-Noun and Draw-a-Phrase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.4 Inkblot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.5 Face Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.6 CAPTCHA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5 Mitigating Oine Dictionary Attacks 41
5.1 Description of CHS proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7
5.2 POSH requirements imposed by CHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.3 Using POSH-derived keys for encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6 An implementation for Firefox 45
7 Conclusions and Future Work 49
8
List of Figures
2-1 Pinkas and Sander's scheme for online dictionary attacks . . . . . . . 18
2-2 A naïve solution to the EKE problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2-3 The Encrypted Key Exchange protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2-4 Three Inkblots designed to encourage stronger passwords . . . . . . 21
2-5 A Déjà Vu password prompt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2-6 The Face and Story password prompts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3-1 An ESP-Pix CAPTCHA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4-1 Word Association POSH example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4-2 Word Association answer distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4-3 Word Grouping POSH example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4-4 Word Grouping answer distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4-5 Draw-a-Noun and Draw-a-Phrase POSH examples . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4-6 Inkblot POSH example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4-7 Inkblot answer distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4-8 Face Recognition POSH example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4-9 Traditional CAPTCHA POSH example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5-1 The CHS scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6-1 Firefox dialog modiﬁcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
9
10
Chapter 1
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate what we call a puzzle only solvable by humans or
POSH. Like CAPTCHAs, POSHes are puzzles that can be generated by computers
and answered by humans, such that the answer cannot be eﬃciently predicted by
a computer [vABL04]. However, unlike a CAPTCHA, a POSH need not have a
computer-veriﬁable answer; the only requirement is that a person's answer to a given
puzzle is consistent over time.
Everything that is a CAPTCHA is by deﬁnition also a POSH, but not vice versa.
For example, What is your favorite food? is not a valid CAPTCHA (there is no
correct answer) but is a valid POSH. We are interested in exploring this space fur-
ther: what features make for a desirable POSH? What constraints aﬀect the POSHes
we can reasonably create? Which POSHes are actually fun to solve?
The study of POSHes is not just one done for the sake of academic curiosity:
they have interesting security applications. One such application is a scheme that
mitigates dictionary attacks on password-protected local storage, in the absence of
secure hardware or secret storage. Additionally, the Inkblot scheme of [SS04] is es-
sentially an application of POSHes to the problem of generating stronger passwords.
Finally, security questions used to verify the user's identity (commonly seen on bank
websites) also ﬁt our deﬁnition of a POSH, to name a few examples.
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A password security application for POSHes
It appears to be a fact of life that user-chosen passwords are weak. They tend to be
low-entropy, and tend to be drawn from a small dictionary. Assigning strong, random
passwords to users often provokes resentment or, worse, cheating  they just write
them down on notepads left near their computers, largely defeating the point. There
must be a better alternative to weak passwords: it is clear that the human mind can be
incredibly inventive and can perform complex computations, but these powers simply
don't seem to be used for passwords. Is there a better interface for harnessing this as-
of-yet untapped potential? We contend that using POSHes provides the beginnings
of an answer, and is a step in the right direction.
We target the following threat model: the user has a laptop whose hard drive is
encrypted with a secret key derived from the user's password. The attacker steals the
laptop, mounts the hard drive in his own machine, and launches an oine dictionary
attack against the secret key. More generally, this is the problem of mitigating dic-
tionary attacks against password-protected local storage, without secure hardware or
secret storage.
Protecting against dictionary attacks in this restricted setting seems impossible.
However, in 2006, Canetti, Halevi, and Steiner proposed a scheme that makes use of
POSHes to accomplish these goals [CHS06]. The gist of the scheme is that testing
each password requires the solutions to a unique set of POSHes, even for the oine
attacker. Since solving POSHes require humans (by deﬁnition!), this dramatically
slows down the rate at which an attacker can make guesses, crippling the attack.
However, the system was never implemented, and if one is truly concerned with
practicality, implementation is everything.
This paper
A POSH has very simple requirements: a human must be able to answer it consis-
tently, and a computer must not be able to eﬃciently predict human answers. With
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an eye towards practical application, we consider the following metrics on which a
POSH should be evaluated.
Consistency When presented with the same POSH, how reproducible is a user's
answer? The level of consistency will clearly vary across POSHes, and the
acceptable level will vary by application (some may be more lenient than others).
Entropy By entropy, we mean two things: First, do diﬀerent people answer the
same POSH in the same way? Second, how hard is it for an adversary to guess
the user's answer, given the POSH? For the POSH to be good in this respect,
there should be a sizable set of possible answers, and furthermore it should be
computationally hard to predict the user's answer from the POSH alone. These
questions become particularly relevant in security or cryptographic applications,
where we want to use POSHes to generate secrets.
Fun A good POSH should not require any specialized knowledge or complicated
actions, and should have a low barrier to entry. Relatedly, it should not be too
time-consuming or tedious. It is worth noting that fun may also markedly aﬀect
the other parameters. For example, a fun puzzle may be easier to remember.
Ease of generation How diﬃcult is it to generate a given POSH? Can it be gen-
erated given only randomness, or does it require a precomputed/pregenerated
corpus? If so, how much space does such a corpus occupy? What is the yield
of this corpus  is an entry in the corpus required for each new POSH, or can
several POSHes be generated from a given entry? Can the POSH be generated
or stored without its answer? ([CHS06] requires this property)
Implementation Finally, how easy is it to implement? Does it require complex
and elaborate graphics, or can it be implemented for a text-only system? How
accessible is it?
With these requirements in mind, we explore seven diﬀerent POSHes:
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1. Word Association: The user is presented with six words selected at random,
and is asked for a word he/she associates with each of them.
2. Word Grouping: The user is presented with six words and is asked to section
them oﬀ into two diﬀerent groups, categorized any way they wish.
3. Draw-a-Noun: The user is presented with a noun, and asked to draw a 10x10
black-and-white icon representing it.
4. Draw-a-Phrase: Like Draw-a-Noun, only the prompt takes the form of a noun,
followed by a preposition, followed by another noun, and a 15x15 grid is given.
5. Inkblot: Inspired in part by [SS04], the user is presented with a randomly
generated black-and-white ﬁgure reminiscent of a Rorschach inkblot, and asked
for a word or phrase that he/she associates with it.
6. Face Recognition: The user is presented with a cartoon face with randomly
selected features, and asked for an association  based on empirical evidence
that humans are much better than machines at recognizing faces [SBOR06].
7. CAPTCHA: A POSH in the spirit of a traditional CAPTCHA  the user is
presented with fuzzy letters and asked to type them in.
We implemented each of these POSHes and placed them on puzzles.mit.edu, a Web
site we created to test their eﬀectiveness. We then took the Word Association POSH
and wrote an extension for the Mozilla Firefox web browser that uses the CHS scheme
to protect the user's saved passwords and certiﬁcates.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of existing password security techniques, and
Chapter 3 provides an overview of existing CAPTCHAs. Chapter 4 discusses the im-
plementation and results of our seven POSHes. Chapter 5 presents the CHS scheme
for mitigating dictionary attacks in more detail and discusses the additional require-
ments it places on POSHes, and Chapter 6 and describes the implementation of the
scheme for the Mozilla Firefox Web browser. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes, providing
suggestions for future work to be done in this area.
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Chapter 2
Techniques in Password Security
There are (26+ 26+ 32)8 = 848 ≈ 251 possible eight-character passwords that can be
made using uppercase letters, lowercase letters, and punctuation. In the ideal world,
people would choose passwords uniformly from this set. However, passwords tend to
be low-entropy, and are typically taken from a relatively small domain (a dictionary)
with high probability. This is problematic because it lends itself to a dictionary
attack  one where the attacker typically succeeds after trying all the passwords in
the dictionary (as opposed to trying all 251 passwords).
Dictionary attacks come in two varieties: online and oine. In an online dictio-
nary attack, each password attempt is sent to a veriﬁer (a program not under the
attacker's control, a remote machine, etc.) to check. In an oine attack, the attacker
knows something that allows him to determine the password's correctness by himself
(for example, we might know how to compute h, and that h(p) = x). In this chapter,
we survey a variety of techniques designed to address these problems.
2.1 Early work and current practice
In the 1960s, it was common practice for login usernames and passwords to be stored
unencrypted in a password ﬁle designed to be unreadable to the system's users. When
a user attempts to login with password p′, the system looks up the password p as-
sociated with the username. If p = p′, the login is successful, otherwise the user is
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rejected.
This practice was changed when a notable bug on the CTSS time-sharing system
caused the Message of the Day, shown at login, to be overwritten with a copy of
the password ﬁle, exposing everyone's password [Cor91].
It became clear that another approach  one in which the password ﬁle need not
remain secret  was necessary. Evans et. al provide such an approach in [EKW74].
In the password ﬁle, store user, key where key = h(p) and h is a one-way, collision-
resistant hash function. When a user attempts to log in with password p′, compute
h(p′) and succeed if h(p′) = key. Publishing the password ﬁle does not lead to
catastrophic results, since one cannot log in by submitting key, and computing its
inverse, the actual password, is hard.
Unfortunately, this method is susceptible to an oine dictionary attack, if the
attacker can get ahold of the password ﬁle. The idea here is that the attacker pre-
computes h(p′) for all the passwords in his dictionary. Once the attacker gets the
password ﬁle, he merely has to scan his list of hashes to see if there are any matches.
This attack is quite feasible, even on a PDP-11 [MT79].
However, precomputation can be made intractable the use of a salt. The idea
behind this technique  used by Unix  is that, when a user account is created, a
fresh random salt s is selected. The password ﬁle then looks like user, salt, key,
where key = h(p|salt) and | denotes concatenation. If the salt is 32 bits long and
the attacker wants to precompute the password ﬁle entry for p′, he must calculate
232 passwords: h(p′|0) up to h(p′|232 − 1). In this case, generating such a dictionary
before having seen the password ﬁle becomes prohibitively expensive.
If the attacker has the password and is targeting a speciﬁc user, though, he does
not need to compute 232 hashes for every password attempt, because the salt is known
 it is not encrypted. So the attacker may still hash his entire dictionary with the
given salt to try to crack the password, but this has to be done per user.
However, even this is not strong enough. One way to further mitigate such attacks
is to make the hashing step extremely slow and expensive. For example, making
key = KDF(p, salt), where KDF is a complicated key derivation function [Kal00]. A
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candidate for such a function might be something that iteratively applies SHA-256
on p|salt thousands of times. Evaluating KDF on a given input requires a signiﬁcant
amount of computation, and thus it is hoped that doing it for every password in the
attacker's dictionary will take far too long.
Such a scheme, in the vein of the pricing via processing solution to junk mail of
[DN93], is common today. However, it is somewhat distasteful  too few iterations
make computation trivial for a powerful adversary, and too many makes logging on
slow for an authorized users. Furthermore, it is essentially useless in the stolen laptop
scenario, since the attacker has all the time in the world (and can parallelize). Finally,
this also results in something of an arms race: as computers get faster, more iterations
become necessary.
Can we do better? In limited contexts, the answer appears to be yes.
2.2 A Web-based solution
Pinkas and Sander examine the problem of defending against online dictionary attacks
in [PS02], speciﬁcally focusing on the problem of defending a Web site that requires
login.
They begin by describing two commonly-implemented countermeasures against
online dictionary attacks, and refuting them: delayed response, and account locking.
The strategy of delayed response is one in which the server simply waits for a second or
two before responding yes or no to the login request  this means that an attacker
can only try passwords at a system-speciﬁed, slow, rate. The account locking strategy
is one in which a given account is locked out for, say, ﬁve hours after three incorrect
password attempts.
These countermeasures do well if the attacker is trying to compromise a speciﬁc
account, but fail if the goal is to compromise any account. For example, the attacker
can, in parallel, request (u1, p1), (u1, p2), etc., which circumvents the delayed response
scheme. Furthermore, if the list of usernames is large (as it is for most web services),
there are enough that one can pause for ﬁve hours between each attempt, since there
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are plenty of other names to try. In addition, account locking provides a vector for a
denial-of-service attack (and a customer service nightmare).
However, this problem is solvable, by using a test that is easy for computers
to generate and verify, but hard for them to solve  in other words, a CAPTCHA
(more on this in Chapter 3). A simple solution is the following: prompt the user
for a CAPTCHA solution. If the CAPTCHA is solved correctly, prompt for their
username and password, otherwise give up on the process.
This turns out to be somewhat arduous for a serious production-quality Web site,
though, because generating CAPTCHAs for every single login attempt may be too
expensive for the Web server, and because it also represents added work that the user
most likely would be reluctant to deal with every time. Instead, Pinkas and Sander
propose another scheme, which we've simpliﬁed and described here, in Figure 2.2:
1. Prompt for the username and password
2. Check to see if the client has a valid cookie
3. If he does:
(a) Password is correct: Accept
(b) Password is incorrect: show the user a CAPTCHA and Reject regardless
of its result
4. If he does not:
(a) Password is correct: show the user a CAPTCHA. If it is solved correctly,
Accept and set a cookie, else Reject
(b) Password is incorrect: show the user a CAPTCHA and Reject regardless
of its result
Figure 2-1: Pinkas and Sander's scheme for online dictionary attacks
This approach is desirable because legitimate users of the system only have to solve
CAPTCHAs in two cases: when they log in from a new computer, or when their cookie
expires (after, say, 100 successful logins). The chief solvers of the CAPTCHAs are
people who mistype their passwords and the would-be attackers. Pinkas and Sander
also present a modiﬁcation to the system where incorrect password attempts only
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solve CAPTCHAs some of the time, without signiﬁcantly weakening these desirable
properties, the details of which are ﬂeshed out in [PS02].
2.3 Password-based key exchange
A related problem is the following: how can two parties (e.g. a client and server)
agree on a strong session key given only a weak shared secret, like a password?
What's more, we'd like the protocol to protect the password from oine dictionary
attacks. Bellovin and Merritt discuss this in [BM92, BM93], the result of which is a
protocol for encrypted key exchange, or EKE.
We present an abbreviated version of the notation Bellovin and Merritt use in
describing EKE, in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Bellovin and Merritt's notation for EKE
A,B Users of the system (Alice and Bob)
P The password  a shared secret
K A random secret key (for a symmetric cryptosystem)
RA, RB Random exponents
K[info] Symmetric-key encryption of info using key K
K−1[info] Symmetric-key decryption of info using key K
cA, cB Random challenges generated by A and B, respectively
α, β Base and modulus for discrete exponentiation
A naïve approach to such a protocol is illustrated in Figure 2-2.
Alice Bob
Choose large K at random
P [K] -
K = P−1[P [K]]
K["Hello"]ﬀ
K["Hi"] -
Figure 2-2: A naïve solution to the EKE problem
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This solution, however, is susceptible to an oine dictionary attack against P .
The attacker guesses a P ′ and computes K ′ = P ′−1[P [K]]. With K ′, the attacker
decrypts Bob's ﬁrst response. If it is a valid protocol message, then P ′ is the real
password. But all is not lost: a solution to the problem exists, and involves the use
of Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange [DH76]. It is presented in Figure 2-3.
Alice Bob
Choose RA at random Choose RB at random
Choose cA at random Choose cB at random
A,P [αRA (mod β)] -
Compute αRARB (mod β)
and to create session key K
P [αRB (mod β)], K[cB]ﬀ
After decrypting αRB ,
A can also calculate K
K[cA, cB] -
K[cA]ﬀ
K["Hello"] -
Figure 2-3: The Encrypted Key Exchange protocol
There are a few things to notice. The ﬁrst, and most interesting, is that this
approach has ﬁxed the oine dictionary attack problem. A password guess P ′ gives
the attacker two candidate values: αRA
′
and αRB
′
. However, these are uninteresting:
since these values are essentially chosen at random (since RA and RB are chosen ran-
domly), they do not leak any real information about the correctness or incorrectness
of the guess. What's more, an attacker cannot use them to compute a candidate K ′
(to see if a valid protocol message is being sent after the key exchange completes),
under the assumption that the discrete log problem is hard.
It is also worth noting that the third and fourth messages (with challenges and
responses) provide protection against a man-in-the-middle attack, and that a modiﬁ-
cation to EKE exists that permits the use of a hashed version of the password rather
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than the password itself [BM93].
Signiﬁcant further work has been done in this area, as well. Many people, including
[BPR00], have provided provide a set of formal deﬁnitions and analysis for the EKE
protocol and related solutions. In particular, [CHK+05] provides deﬁnitions and a
way to solve this problem that is secure under the universally composable security
framework [Can01], which means that the protocol remains secure even when run
concurrently with arbitrary other protocols.
2.4 Inkblots for stronger passwords
Another approach of note is one which tries to improve the quality of the user-selected
password. The system, Inkblots [SS04], generates a series of images that look like
Rorschach Inkblots, and displays them to the user. The user is supposed to come up
with an association for each inkblot, and, to create a password, takes the ﬁrst and
last letters from each association and concatenates them. So, if inkblots 1, 2, and 3
reminded the user of helicopter, hippo doing stretches, and crab, the resulting
password would be hrhscb. These inkblots can be seen in Figure 2-4.
Figure 2-4: Three Inkblots designed to encourage stronger passwords
Here, unlike any other strategy shown above, the user is essentially given an algo-
rithm for picking a password based on computer input, rather than coming up with
his or her own, and having it strengthened by other mechanisms. While innovative, it
is unclear to what extent rigorous analysis can be performed on the Inkblots  if the
majority of them look similar, it is not clear that they will be a good source of entropy.
However, preliminary studies done (and referenced) in [SS04] look promising.
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That point notwithstanding, the Inkblots display an approach diﬀerent from any
discussed above; one in which the user is encouraged to create a password more
resilient to dictionary attacks, rather than simply making dictionary attacks more
diﬃcult.
2.5 Other graphical password schemes
The history of graphical password schemes is a long and storied one. Unfortunately,
few of these schemes seem to have caught on in practice, but we review a few that
seem especially topical below.
Jermyn et al. attempt to combat weak passwords by proposing Draw-a-Secret
[JMM+99], a graphical scheme in which the user's drawing is converted into a bit-
string that serves as the user's password. They implemented the system as a login
mechanism for a PDA, and the system is further analyzed in [TvO04]. It is quite
similar to our Draw-a-Noun POSH. One important diﬀerence, however, is that we
tell the user what to draw (e.g. draw a house), whereas Draw-a-Secret does not.
Also in the space of graphical passwords, Dhamija and Perrig propose Déjà Vu
[DP00]. The system works as follows. At account setup time, the user is presented
with n images, and selects k of them to be his password. Later, when he wishes to log
on, the system presents n images (possibly the same, possibly new ones, as long as
the k are included) to the user, and he must select the same k to log on successfully.
In a sense, this is also POSH  the prompt is a set of n images, and the question is
Which of these look familiar? An example is shown in Figure 2-5.
Finally, Davis et al. perform a study [DMR04] of two graphical password schemes,
Face and Story. In Face, like Déjà Vu, at initialization time, the user is shown n faces
and selects k of them for her password. To log in, the user is shown n faces and has to
select his k. In Story, the user is shown n images and has to select k of them in order,
that are supposed to tell a story. Examples of these two are shown in Figure 2-6.
In Story, for example, one might pick the man (in the top-center), the keys (in the
bottom-right), and the car (in the center), because the story is A man gets keys to
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Figure 2-5: A Déjà Vu password prompt
Figure 2-6: The Face and Story password prompts
go drive his car.
Their results (particularly applicable to the Face Recognition POSH) are the fol-
lowing. People tend to prefer attractive faces, often from their own ethnicities, so the
eﬀective entropy of the scheme is signiﬁcantly reduced for Face. For Story, few users
actually construct a story  they can easily remember the image, but do not often
recall the image order correctly.
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Chapter 3
CAPTCHA Overview
The idea of a test administered by a computer, that can distinguish computers from
humans, appears to have ﬁrst been proposed in [Nao96]. There, Naor proposes a hand-
ful of candidate puzzles, all believed to be easy for humans and hard for computers,
and mostly from the area of computer vision. Potential tests that are suggested are:
gender recognition, facial expression recognition, detecting nudity, reading handwrit-
ing, recognizing speech, ﬁlling in the blanks, et cetera. However, the paper is largely
theoretical; there is little to no mention of implementation details.
Such tests received many names: Turing tests, reverse Turing tests, and CAPTCHAs,
but one thing that emerged relatively quickly was that a test based on the diﬃculty
of recognizing characters was both straightforward to implement and enjoyed a fairly
high success rate.
3.1 Fuzzy Text Recognition
The ﬁrst successful implementation of this idea was a system where the user is pre-
sented with fuzzy letters, and asked to read them. Andrei Broder et. al [LABB01]
are believed to be the ﬁrst to have actually implemented such a system, while at
AltaVista. There, it was used to foil bots trying to submit URLs into the AltaVista
index.
This work was soon followed by others, including [CFB01]. There, Coates et. al
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suggest the idea of Pessimal Print  text manipulated in ways designed to be hard for
OCR software. In [vABL04], Luis von Ahn coins the term CAPTCHA, and proposes
a similar scheme, named Gimpy.
After it became clear that CAPTCHAs were useful and not just a research cu-
riosity, they began to spring up everywhere, largely in a security context: as a way
to prevent denial-of-service attacks or comment spam, or as a way of slowing down
brute-force attacks.
3.2 Other Approaches
In the same work, von Ahn et. al propose some a handful of other CAPTCHAs:
Bongo, a visual pattern recognition puzzle, Eco, a sound recognition puzzle, and
Pix, a label-the-object puzzle. In Pix, the user is presented with blurred images of
an object, and asks What are these images of? An implementation of Pix, known
as ESP-Pix, is shown in Figure 3-1.
Figure 3-1: An ESP-Pix CAPTCHA
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Speech CAPTCHAs, where words are said over white noise, seem to show promise
[KLS02], but getting sound to work just right in a Web browser, e.g., can be an
inconvenience at best and a major annoyance at worst.
Despite the existence of these other techniques, fuzzy text CAPTCHAs remain
the most popular. While simple to implement, these (and any graphical scheme) are
inaccessible to the blind. The existence of a robust text-based CAPTCHA would
certainly solve this problem, though it is also still believed to be quite challenging,
despite some promising work in the area [God02]. For more, [LS05] provides a nice
survey of CAPTCHA techniques and implementations.
3.3 Corpus-based CAPTCHAs
Another interesting trend is the move towards corpus-based CAPTCHAs, like re-
CAPTCHA [vA07]. reCAPTCHA is a project to digitize books by turning words
that trigger OCR errors into CAPTCHAs. The scheme works as follows: the user is
presented with two blurry words, one that the computer knows and one that it does
not, in a random order. The human reads both words, and submits the answer. If
his answer to the known word is correct, we use his answer to the unknown word as
a vote for the actual correct answer.
Interestingly enough, this is more of a POSH than a CAPTCHA, since the correct
answer is not known to the computer. However, this problem is solved by the sheer
number of users of the system  if enough people agree on an answer, the system
decides that it is correct.
The downside, of course, is that these types of CAPTCHAs can only be generated
and veriﬁed by someone with access to a speciﬁc (often large) corpus. So, to use
reCAPTCHA on one's site, one must trust von Ahn et. al to return the correct result
 a requirement that does not exist with traditional CAPTCHA.
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Chapter 4
Evaluating POSHes
Recall that our goal was to test the eﬀectiveness of seven POSHes: Word Asso-
ciation, Word Grouping, Draw-a-Noun, Draw-a-Phrase, Inkblot, and a traditional
CAPTCHA. We set up a Web site, puzzles.mit.edu, where we implemented the
POSHes and invited users to solve them. Each user is required to create an account
before solving POSHes, but no other data is required (the user has the option of
telling us his/her e-mail address).
After logging in, the user is presented with a list of all the POSHes that he or
she can solve, and can elect to solve brand-new ones, or re-solve previously-seen ones
(in order to test recall for a given POSH). In addition, the user may skip a POSH if
he/she does not want to solve it. After solving a POSH, the user is shown everyone
else's answers to the just-solved puzzle.
As of this writing, the Web site has been available for slightly over two months,
has approximately 80 users, and has seen roughly 2500 page loads. We now describe
each POSH in more detail, along with its results.
4.1 Word Association
Six words are selected at random from a corpus, and the user is asked for a word
that he or she associates with each of them. We chose a corpus of 505 words derived
from a Pictionary wordlist [Eng07], with the rationale that they would be reasonably
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common and have strong associations. Figure 4-1 shows one set of these POSHes
being solved.
Figure 4-1: Six solved Word Association POSHes
Word Association was the most popular POSH we studied: 56 users collectively
solved 1,163 puzzles (in 193 submissions, since each submission contains six puzzles),
suggesting that it has a low barrier to entry and is fairly fun.
Consistency The consistency of answers was also fairly good: 19 users re-solved 331
puzzles, and 64% of the new responses were the same as the user's original response,
suggesting that Word Association is reasonably memorable without any concerted
eﬀort or practice. (The numbers are unfavorably skewed by users that entered some
word a on a ﬁrst attempt, and then a diﬀerent word b for all subsequent attempts 
a somewhat common failure mode.)
Entropy The data suggest that some words have very strong associations, but most
do not. We examine the 28 most popular of these POSHes (the ones answered by
the most unique users) to get a better sense of this. For each of the POSHes, we
found the most popular answer, and then computed the percentage of overall answers
that the most common answer represents. These results are shown in Figure 4-2. For
example, four eyes appears on the very far right, since nearly everyone associated
glasses with it. On the other hand, no two users came up with the same association
for wine glass: answers ranged from classy and merlot to harmonica1.
1If someone can ﬁgure out the train of thought that leads to this answer, please let us know.
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Pinning down the entropy in such a puzzle is diﬃcult: a naïve attacker would
potentially have to try a large subset of all English words. For reference, Shakespeare's
complete works contain approximately 29,000 words [Sha], and the language has
grown rapidly since then. A more clever attacker might dramatically reduce this
number by guessing common associations more intelligently (synonyms, antonyms,
words that frequently appear by the prompt, etc.). Analyzing this case well is more
challenging.
bumblebee
electric guitar
edge
knee eight ball
middle ﬁn
roller skate cupcake full
tree dress joker cane ladybug
cross eyed telephone pole patch hook shield right
wine glass tuning fork pipe lapel multiply thermometer four eyes
<10% 1020% 2030% 3040% 4050% 5060% 6090% 90100%
Prompts, categorized by the percentage of respondents that picked the most popular answer
Figure 4-2: Word Association answer distribution
Ease of generation Word Association does less well on ease of generation. We
can only generate 505 unique puzzles  the size of the corpus. Corpora this small
lend themselves to attempts at exhaustive enumeration, by which we mean humans
building a large database of reasonable answers, which a computer could use to solve
the POSH. Furthermore, making the corpus much bigger runs the risk of prompting
users with words that they may not know (and thus, prompts for which they do not
have memorable associations).
Implementation The implementation is straightforward, and has several desirable
properties: the task is easy (and something users don't ﬁnd foreign), and the user
interface is simple and accessible  which means that it can work on screen readers
or in a text-only environment like a login prompt. Showing each puzzle is also simple
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and space-eﬃcient; one merely chooses a word at random out of a list.
4.2 Word Grouping
Using the same corpus as above, the user is presented with six words, and is asked to
divide the group into two subsets, using any categorizing the user wishes. Figure 4-3
shows an example. Word Grouping was unfortunately not that popular  28 unique
users solved 98 puzzles (in 49 submissions).
Figure 4-3: A solved Word Grouping POSH, grouped by natural vs. man-made
Consistency Though not especially fun, Word Grouping seems somewhat memo-
rable without much practice: of the 10 users that went back and re-solved 34 puzzles,
58% of them were recalled perfectly. We suspect that this rate can be boosted with
a tiny bit of practice, since users merely have to remember how they reached their
categorizations (e.g. alive or inanimate), not the actual results, and can apply the
same technique to many POSHes.
Entropy In principle, each POSH has 26 possible outputs, and we expect to see
a large amount of variation. In practice, this seems to hold up as well  few of the
8 most popular puzzles had duplicates in their solutions. A breakdown is shown in
Figure 4-4.
Ease of generation Word Grouping has some of the same limitations on its corpus
 it cannot become too large or users will not recognize some of the words. However,
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Prompts, categorized by the percentage of respondents that picked the most popular answer
% users selecting mode Prompts
0010% bigfoot, cloverleaf, odd, point, shoulder, starﬁsh
broken heart, drip, fold, hat, icicle, screwdriver
horseshoe, knee pad, right hand, skull, tuning fork, two left feet
1020% direction, drawbridge, label, small, stereo, twins
2030% concave, dart, eat, pelican, pencil, vertical
eye, hook, oval, rocket, slot machine, spider web
3040% beard, book, elephant, headband, necktie, northstar
4050%
5060% hot air balloon, screwdriver, see, stoplight, sunglasses, tic tac toe
6070%
7080%
8090%
90100%
Figure 4-4: Word Grouping answer distribution
the problematic feature of Word Association was that each word's answer was inde-
pendent of all of the other words; not so with Word Grouping. To solve the puzzles,
one theoretically needs to use information from all of the words. As a result, a corpus
of size n and a puzzle of size k yields
(
n
k
)
possible puzzles, or, in our case,
(
505
6
)
, which
is a very desirable result.
Implementation The implementation of Word Grouping has all of the same ad-
vantages of Word Association: it only requires a text-based interface, and the task is
simple. Constructing the puzzles from the corpus is also simple  just select six at
random.
4.3 Draw-a-Noun and Draw-a-Phrase
Since the Draw-a-Noun and Draw-a-Phrase POSHes are so similar, we combine their
discussion into one section. In Draw-a-Noun, one word is selected at random from
our Pictionary corpus, and the user is asked to illustrate it, using a 10×10 black-and-
white grid. Draw-a-Phrase works very similarly, only two words are selected from the
corpus, and joined with one preposition, selected from a list of 50. The user is given
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this word/preposition/word prompt, and asked to illustrate it with a 15×15 grid.
Examples of both of these are shown in Figure 4-5.
Figure 4-5: A solved Draw-a-Noun (left) and Draw-a-Phrase (right) POSH
Draw-a-Noun was deﬁnitely among the most popular of the POSHes: 30 users
collectively drew 258 drawings (in 129 submissions), suggesting that even though
illustrating is more work than some of the other POSHes, it is entertaining. However,
this amusement is not without limit: Draw-a-Phrase was by far the least popular
POSH we studied: 14 users collectively drew 60 drawings (in 30 submissions), which
is quite low compared with the other puzzles. It is fair to conclude that this POSH
was simply not fun.
Consistency While fun, unfortunately, Draw-a-Noun does not appear to be espe-
cially memorable. Seven users went back and re-drew 26 puzzles. Of these, only
slightly over 15% of all re-draws were identical to the ﬁrst inputs. One problematic
aspect of the results is that, occasionally, the image was the same, but shifted by a
pixel. Fortunately, addressing the shifted-image problem is quite doable, using tech-
niques similar to those in [JMM+99]. The gist of the idea is to derive the POSH
solution from the start and end points of every line drawn, and to do so at a more
coarse resolution than that of the canvas. For example, we could represent our 10×10
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grid as a 5×5 grid for the purposes of tracking lines. If that is done, we can tolerate
an oﬀ-by-one-pixel error in three directions, for any given point. The downside to
such an approach, however, is a decrease in the amount of available entropy.
As for Draw-a-Phrase, few users bothered to go back and re-draw puzzles in the
ﬁrst place  the ﬁve that did went back to draw 16 images. Of those, no one was
able to successfully recreate a drawing, suggesting that recalling a 15×15 image given
these prompts is a diﬃcult task.
Entropy For Draw-a-Noun, there are, in principle, 100 bits to be set with each
illustration, so there are 2100 possible drawings. Realistically, not all of these will
occur, so we oﬀer the following approximation: Suppose a drawing contains eight
lines. Each of these lines starts and ends at an arbitrary coordinate in the canvas, of
which there are 100. So we have somewhere near 10× 100× 100 = 100,000 possible
answers.
Additionally, we expect that the chance of two people illustrating the same thing
the same way should be quite small. Of the 30 unique prompts, only two had some
identical illustrations: three illustrators for full drew an all-black icon, and the two
illustrators of negative drew a ﬁve-pixel-long minus sign in the middle of the canvas.
No two people illustrated the exact same thing for any other prompt. This trend is
reﬂected in the Draw-a-Phrase results as well: no two users had identical drawings.
Ease of generation Generation of Draw-a-Noun works exactly like Word Associ-
ation, and suﬀers from the same ﬂaws  the number of unique puzzles is equal to
the size of the corpus, and the corpus must additionally remain fairly small or the
prompts will become too hard to draw.
Draw-a-Phrase, on the other hand, gets a better yield from the corpus. Since a
puzzle is constructed with noun/preposition/noun, the number of possible puzzles is
|N | · |P | · |N |, or, in this case, 505× 50× 505 = 12, 751, 250 puzzles.
Implementation Draw-a-Noun and Draw-a-Phrase are departures from our previ-
ous puzzles in that they are somewhat graphical. They require some way of marking
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grid squares either oﬀ or on, so it could still be done in a text-based environment like
a terminal. However, they are not very accessible and would not interact well with a
screen reader, for example.
4.4 Inkblot
In a change of pace from word prompts, we decided to explore some more graphical
options. In Inkblot, the user is presented with a randomly generated image reminis-
cent of a Rorschach inkblot (using a modiﬁed version of [Hal01]), and asked for a word
or phrase that he/she associates with it. Figure 4-6 shows one such inkblot. Inkblots
were fairly popular  32 unique users solved 200 puzzles (in 100 submissions), so it
seems safe to conclude that they are fairly fun.
Figure 4-6: An Inkblot POSH
Consistency Ten of the users went back and re-solved 60 of the inkblots, and
roughly 64% of the new solutions matched the originals perfectly. Of those that
did not, about half were one-bit errors (e.g. making a word plural rather than
singular), and the others were just diﬀerent associations. While not perfect, this
POSH shows relatively promising rates of recall. (User studies in [SS04] also conﬁrm
this observation).
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Entropy Like Word Association, some inkblots had very strong associations for
many people, but most do not. Of the 20 unique puzzles solved by our users, the
large majority (14) had no common answers, and in the remaining ones, the mode
answer only represented approximately 10% of the total answers, with three excep-
tions: inkblots that looked a lot like a face, crab, and heart. Figure 4-7 shows the
breakdown in more detail.
In terms of space of possible answers, we expect the user inputs to provide roughly
as much entropy as a randomly chosen English phrase, while remaining resistant to
the frequency-based attacks that pose problems for Word Association.
Prompts, categorized by the percentage of respondents that picked the most popular answer
% users selecting mode Prompts
0010% 10011, 14605, 15531, 18248, 27590, 35195, 35849,
49118, 53619, 55076, 57475, 61492, 62647, 62844
1020% 26535, 46998, 56230
2030% 49032 (face)
3040%
4050%
5060% 38145 (crab)
6070%
7080%
8090%
90100% 9027 (heart)
Figure 4-7: Inkblot answer distribution
Ease of generation Inkblots do extremely well on ease of generation. They require
only one argument to generate: a random seed. As a consequence, no corpus needs
to be stored at all; each inkblot can be generated on-the-ﬂy, fairly eﬃciently. In
addition, one can generate an extremely large number of puzzles, limited primarily
by the random number generator.
Implementation One possible improvement to the scheme would be the use of
colors in the inkblots, as in [SS04], in the hopes of making them more memorable.
One of the weaknesses of the Inkblot scheme is its reliance on graphics  it cannot
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be straightforwardly adapted to work in a terminal or text-only device, and it has no
hope of working with screen readers.
4.5 Face Recognition
Continuing the trend of graphical POSHes, the next one we explored was Face Recog-
nition. The motivation here is that humans are much better at recognizing faces than
computers are, and that perhaps we can use that advantage to make a good POSH.
The user is presented with a cartoon face with randomly selected features (hair, ears,
eyes, face, mouth, and nose all selected independently), and prompted with This face
makes me think/feel. . . . An example is shown in Figure 4-8.
Face Recognition was only moderately popular  30 users solved 130 puzzles (in 65
submissions), which puts it in ﬁfth place (above Word Grouping and Draw-a-Phrase).
Figure 4-8: A Face Recognition POSH
Consistency Perhaps an unfavorable indication of their level of fun, not many users
went back and re-solved these puzzles. For the ﬁve that re-examined 20 puzzles, only
35% of the answers matched the originals perfectly. Those that didn't were generally
fairly oﬀ-target, unlike the Inkblots.
Entropy Most faces tended to be high-entropy. Of the 27 unique faces seen by the
users, all but one yielded diﬀerent responses. The one that wasn't was thought to be
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french by two users, but this represented less than 10% of the replies for the face.
(Other replies included mime and kiss, to name a few).
We expect the answers to be a limited subset of English: descriptions of thoughts
and feelings. The literature also suggests that the entropy is most likely not evenly
distributed by feature  eyebrows seem to matter most for face recognition [SBOR06].
Ease of generation The features we varied were ears (2 versions), eyes (5), facial
shape (7), hair (6), mouth (7), and nose (5), allowing for 2×5×7×6×7×5 = 14, 700
unique faces. This POSH has the nice property that adding additional features has
very high yield. Mixing and matching features is a much more eﬃcient construction
than having to provide a corpus of completely-drawn faces.
Implementation An implementation suggestion that might make the faces more
memorable would be the use of photographs of human features, rather than cartoons.
Another variation on this scheme could pose the question Who or what does this
face remind you of? in which case we could add names to our list of possible an-
swers. Additionally, like Inkblot, Face Recognition's reliance on graphics hinders its
accessibility.
4.6 CAPTCHA
The ﬁnal POSH we examine is one that is a traditional CAPTCHA  that is to say,
fuzzy letters that the user is asked to read. We use a slightly modiﬁed variant of
[Nie08] to generate the CAPTCHAs, and an example is shown in Figure 4-9.
Figure 4-9: A traditional CAPTCHA POSH
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CAPTCHA did fairly well  35 users solved 190 CAPTCHAs (in 95 submissions),
suggesting the not-terribly-surprising result that they are straightforward to solve.
Consistency Ten users went back and re-solved 46 CAPTCHAs, and 100% of them
solved them the exact same way, which does not come as a huge surprise.
Entropy Nearly everyone provided the same solutions for all of the CAPTCHAs;
there was essentially no variation. In two of the 22 unique puzzles solved by the most
users, one user confused a z with an x and an o with an a, but all of the other
answers were the same.
While there was basically no inter-user variation, CAPTCHA does quite well in
terms of the amount of entropy it is capable of providing. There are 44 possible letters
in each position (upper and lowercase, with commonly-confused pairs like C/G, I/l,
Q/O, h/b removed), and ﬁve possible positions, yielding 445 ≈ 227 possible puzzle
answers.
Ease of generation CAPTCHAs are, by design, fairly easy to generate  they
simply require the text to be rendered and some randomness. At ﬁrst blush, this
POSH passes our tests with ﬂying colors: it does not require a corpus, and it is easy
to make many of them. However, there is a bit of a catch: generating CAPTCHAs
also requires their answers. If we need them without answers, as we do in [CHS06],
we need to do a bit more. This is described in more detail in Chapter 5.
Implementation Like its fellow graphical POSHes, this style of CAPTCHA cannot
be used in a text-only environment, and thus is not especially accessible.
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Chapter 5
Mitigating Oine Dictionary Attacks
5.1 Description of CHS proposal
Recall that our goal is to mitigate oine dictionary attacks, without any sort of secret
storage, secure hardware (like a smart card or hardware token), or assistance by a
remote server (unlike in the scheme of [PS02]). Canetti, Halevi, and Steiner present
such a scheme in [CHS06], which we informally describe here.
Let us assume that the system has the ability to present a large number of possible
POSHes  either by having computed them in advance or by generating them on-the-
ﬂy. Furthermore, suppose that all the POSHes are stored in a large array, and are
addressable by an index.
The user begins the login process by supplying a username and a password. We
compute p1, p2, . . . , pn = Expand(pw), where Expand is a deterministic function that
takes the password as an argument, and returns the indices of several POSHes that
the user needs to solve. Expand should behave like a random function, in the sense
that each diﬀerent password should map to a new, random set of indices. More
speciﬁcally, [CHS06] shows that Expand needs to behave like a good expander graph.
The user solves the puzzles, and computes k = Extract(pw, s1, s2, . . . , sn), where
si is the solution to POSH pi. With appropriate selection of Expand and Extract, k
should appear pseudorandom. In particular, it should be hard to guess k. We then
use k to encrypt our local storage (or as the actual password, if we use the scheme
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solely for authentication). Figure 5-1 illustrates the process.
Expand
Puzzles
p1
p2
p3
s1
s2
s3
Human solves selected puzzles
Extract
Solutions
kpw
Figure 5-1: The CHS scheme
If we do this, an attacker mounting an oine dictionary attack against your data
has two options: one is to try to guess the secret key k directly. Given that k is hard
to guess, this will be challenging  comparable to a brute-force search of the keyspace.
The other alternative is to make guesses at the (probably) weak password pw  but
each guess of pw also requires a human to solve new POSHes, signiﬁcantly slowing
down the attack.
5.2 POSH requirements imposed by CHS
Recall that POSHes need not have a computer-veriﬁable answer. In some cases, how-
ever, they do  the process of generating a CAPTCHA involves knowing its solution.
In the CHS scheme, the answer to a given POSH must not be known at login-time,
because if it is, it can be accessed by the attacker. In other words, the POSH gener-
ator cannot simply take pi and display a CAPTCHA of pi, because the attacker also
knows pi given a password guess (and thus knows the CAPTCHA's solution). Con-
trast this with the Inkblot POSH. For the Inkblot POSH, it is perfectly acceptable
to seed the Inkblot generator with pi, because knowing pi does not help the attacker
determine the answer.
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This is not a fatal ﬂaw in CAPTCHAs, however. The solution is to pre-generate
and store a large number of CAPTCHAs, discard their answers, and shue them
around. Now, selecting the CAPTCHA with index pi tells the attacker no information
about its solution. The downside is the additional space requirement required to store
all of the CAPTCHA images.
We also require an additional property of our POSHes: that they not be malleable
 that is, a human solution to POSH a should not provide a computer any help in
predicting the solution to POSH b. If this is not the case, the oine attacker can
defeat the scheme by having humans solve a small subset of the POSHes, and using
those solutions to predict reasonable answers for the others.
5.3 Using POSH-derived keys for encryption
Traditional encryption schemes assume that the randomness present in the secret key
is uniform. The output of the Extract function may be random, but we may not
have guarantees about the uniformity of this randomness over its many bits. As a
consequence, we need to use a scheme that provides security even in the presence
of this potentially weak key. An example of such a scheme is [CD08], but further
research in this direction is warranted.
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Chapter 6
An implementation for Firefox
The Mozilla Firefox Web browser can remember usernames and passwords for users,
as well as private keys and personal certiﬁcates. It stores these in its Software Security
Device. All of the information in the Software Security Device is encrypted by the
user's Master Password [Fou01].
This setup is exactly one in which the CHS scheme is appropriate: a malicious
user or program can copy the encrypted contents of Software Security Device from the
user's disk for later oine attacks. Firefox already has a mechanism for prompting the
user for his/her Master Password, so implementing the scheme is simply a matter of
writing an extension to replace the correct dialog boxes. For comparison, the original
Get Master Password dialog box and our replacement are shown side-by-side in
Figure 6-1. Similar modiﬁcations were required for the Set Master Password and
Remove Master Password dialog boxes.
We chose the Word Association POSH for use in our implementation, because it
was popular and simple, both in UI and in actual implementation. For Expand, we
computed the SHA-1 hash of the password, divided the resultant 160 bits into six
26-bit numbers, took those numbers modulo the size of our corpus, and used them as
indices into our word list. Extract was also very straightforward  we concatenated the
password and all of the POSH answers together, and passed the result on to Firefox,
as though it were entered into the original dialog box.
Note that, in our dialog box, the POSHes are displayed at the same time as
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Figure 6-1: Firefox Get Master Password window before and after our changes
the password is. As the password is entered, the POSHes change (the SHA-1 is
recomputed with every keystroke). This has the (unexpected!) beneﬁt of giving
an authorized user faster feedback about an incorrect password. When the correct
password is entered, the usual POSHes appear; when it isn't, foreign ones do, and
the fact that an error has been made is quickly apparent.
The implementation itself was reasonably straightforward. In general, windows in
Firefox are speciﬁed using XUL  an XML-based user interface language. Anything
speciﬁed by XUL can be overridden by an extension; thus, one dialog can be seamlessly
replaced with another.
Unfortunately, as of this writing, the speciﬁcs of Firefox's internals mean that
the Get Master Password dialog box does not use XUL (it is created directly in
nsNSSCallbacks.cpp), meaning that it cannot be easily replaced. To address this,
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we submitted a patch [Dah08] that makes Firefox use a XUL window instead (and thus
allows extensions to replace it). It has yet to be accepted into the mainline branch,
though we expect the patch to be non-controversial, since the user experience does not
change at all (only our extension modiﬁes the dialog box), and installed extensions
must be fully trusted by the user, so the change does not pose a security risk. In the
interim, we developed the extension against a patched local build of Firefox.
The Change and Remove windows did use XUL, and thus did not require
recompilation to modify. Once the patch was applied, three new XUL ﬁles needed to
be created (getmp.xul, setmp.xul, and changemp.xul) to serve as the replacement
dialog boxes. These specify how the window should look; the actual logic needs to be
speciﬁed elsewhere, in JavaScript. To accomplish this, we wrote password.js, which
performs the logic for all three windows (which seems reasonable since there is a good
deal of overlap: changing and removing the password essentially ﬁrst require you to
get it). It is here that the actual implementation of the CHS scheme is provided. A
breakdown of all of these ﬁles, and their associated sizes, is provided in Table 6.1.
Filename Size (lines) Purpose
Patch -51,+44 Call a user-speciﬁed XUL window to get the password,
instead of the hard-coded prompt
getmp.xul +74 XUL Speciﬁcation for Get Master Password window
changemp.xul +139 XUL Speciﬁcation for Change Master Password window
removemp.xul +87 XUL Speciﬁcation for Remove Master Password window
password.js +239 Code to make windows functional and perform CHS
sha1.js +100 A SHA-1 implementation (used in password)
words.js +505 Word Association corpus (used in password)
Table 6.1: Firefox modiﬁcations
The Firefox extension is licensed under the GPL and the code is freely available
on our Web site, at http://puzzles.mit.edu/firefox/.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
We explore the notion of a puzzle only solvable by humans (POSH), and propose
metrics on which good POSHes should be evaluated: consistency, entropy, fun, ease
of generation, and ease of implementation. With this framework in mind, we imple-
mented and got feedback on seven diﬀerent POSHes: Word Association, Word Group-
ing, Draw-a-Noun, Draw-a-Phrase, Inkblot, Face Recognition, and CAPTCHA. Our
preliminary results suggest that something like Word Association, Inkblot, and Draw-
a-Noun, along with traditional CAPTCHA, have potential to be strong POSHes,
though we suggest that more extensive user study is in order for each of them.
In addition, we show a security application for POSHes, and provide a concrete
implementation of the CHS scheme, using a Word Association POSH. In so doing, we
end up with an interesting ﬁnding: the puzzle selection provides a quick conﬁrmation
to the user that he or she entered the password correctly. In fact, this idea can be
extended fairly straightforwardly in the online case. If the server uses an HMAC-
SHA1 for Expand, the CHS scheme can provide mutual authentication: after entering
the password, only the real server can compute which POSHes need to be presented
to the user. If the user does not see his familiar POSHes, he knows that something
is amiss. This is similar to SiteKey [Ban], but the puzzles are computed on a secret
password, rather than an easily-guessable username.
However, more work remains to be done. For example, the CHS scheme oﬀers no
security against a few common threats: it is vulnerable to a keylogger/replay attack,
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as well as to shoulder surfers. Solutions to these problems with the system would go
a long way in increasing the practicality of its use.
Furthermore, while we have provided ﬁrst steps at proposing and analyzing POSHes,
many other candidates need to be explored, and more precise analysis needs to be
undertaken. Some POSH suggestions are provided in [CHS06], but additional work
in this area is required. One set of promising candidates appears to be games : a
POSH derived from a game has the advantage that it is essentially guaranteed to be
fun, since people already solve them for entertainment.
That said, more work is also needed to discover exactly how much entropy is
actually present in each POSH, as a way of determining how vulnerable they are to
guessing attacks.
Additionally, such studies need to be done in settings more regulated than a Web
site, where users can be forced to re-solve puzzles on a regular basis. Practicing the
same puzzle several times after it is ﬁrst selected would also help address the issue of
drift  where users answer with some response a the ﬁrst time, forget it, and then
substitute a diﬀerent response b in all subsequent answers.
We end with the following suggestion: ways to improve the user experience should
be paramount. Fundamentally, security comes down to user cooperation, and if the
system is too tedious, people will not use it, regardless of the beneﬁts it may poten-
tially provide.
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